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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505



2 May 1974

Mr. Andrew W. Marshall
Director, Net Assessment
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Dear Andy:

Thank you for your note of 29 April enclosing your 16 April memorandum for the DOD Net Assessment Steering Committee outlining the proposed structure of your net assessment program over the course of the next two years. It is an ambitious program which, when completed, will shed useful light on a number of important subjects. I have taken the liberty of showing your memo to the DCI and other colleagues interested in the topics you plan to treat.

I would indeed welcome the opportunity to discuss some of these topics and their likely implications for intelligence. I would particularly like to talk with you about the last of the four "issues for discussion" outlined in your 16 April memorandum's final section. I suspect there has been a communications garble of some form in this area. So far as I am aware the IC Staff is not "pressing to get involved" in the net assessment field and to my certain knowledge this is not the case with respect to the NIOs. We are concerned about the problem of force projections and analyses of implications which we consider essential in certain Estimates. We are, of course, also aware of the fact that the borderline between force projections and net assessments is sometimes arbitrary or hard to define with any great degree of precision. Nonetheless, we see what we consider a real and important distinction between these two spheres of activity which, though sometimes complementary, should not be overlapping.

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As you are probably aware, Howard Stoertz (the NIO for Strategic Programs) is attempting to resolve -- with CIA and DIA -- the thorny question of how force projections and implication discussions can best be handled in national intelligence products, including National Estimates. This question encompasses the complex matter of how intelligence projections ought to relate to those of the DIPP. If you are interested, Howard will be glad to fill you in on the course of this exercise.

George A. Carver, Jr.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

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
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

29 April 1974

Memo For GEORGE CARVER

As I promised at our last meeting a month or so ago, I am sending you a copy of the net assessment program overview. As we progress in developing issue papers in each of the areas Jim Schlesinger and I have selected for study, perhaps we should get together to discuss the likely implications for intelligence.

As our on-going studies are completed I plan to send you memoranda on the major intelligence problems encountered.



ANDREW W. MARSHALL
Director, Net Assessment

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DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

16 April 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DOD NET ASSESSMENT STEERING COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Net Assessment Program

PURPOSES:

To put before you the proposed structure of the net assessment program over the course of the next two years. The Secretary of Defense has reviewed and generally approved the planned structure. The Steering Committee should discuss the program and how best to implement it.

What follows also provides an outline of work currently underway.

PROGRAM OBJECTIVES:

To provide the Secretary of Defense with:

- Improved assessments of key balances.
- Assessments of the comparative economics of U.S. and Soviet military programs.
- Inputs to the setting of strategic policies for competing more efficiently with the Soviets over the long haul.

In addition an attempt will be made to push defense analysis to include previously neglected aspects, for example:

- The political impact of military forces.
- Areas of likely U.S. advantage such as training, logistics, etc.
- The role of doctrine, organization and institutional history upon force design, cost and effectiveness.

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